Supreme Court confirms a balance to be struck in sentencing Indigenous offenders

Note: This post concerns violence against Indigenous women. Please take care while reading.
On 9 October 2026, the Supreme Court of Canada published its judgment in R v Cope, 2026 SCC 32, where, in a five-four split, the majority of the Court dismissed the appeal, upholding the decision of the Court of Appeal for Nova Scotia. The appeal addressed how sentencing judges must balance sentencing considerations specified in the Criminal Code, RSC 1985, c C‑46 (Criminal Code), which respond to both the overincarceration of Indigenous people, and the unacceptably high levels of violence and abuse suffered by Indigenous woman and girls.
The Asper Centre intervened in the appeal before the Supreme Court of Canada and was represented by Jessica Orkin and Adriel Weaver of Goldblatt Partners LLP.
Background
The respondent, a Mi’kmaw man and member of Millbrook First Nation pled guilty to a charge of aggravated assault of his intimate partner, a Mi’kmaw woman from the Sipekne’katik First Nation, and two counts of breaching his release order.
In the Nova Scotia Provincial Court, an Indigenous Background Report was ordered, along with a sentencing circle. The sentencing circle provided that community members did not feel that further incarceration would help the respondent, with consideration given to his physical and mental wellbeing, and instead recommended a holistic approach to addressing the harm committed, which included in‑patient treatment programming through the Mi’kmaw Family Healing Centre.
In her reasons, the sentencing judge referred to the respondent having suffered as a result of colonization and its intergenerational and systemic effects, and observed that the respondent lived with significant mental illness, which jointly lessened his moral culpability. However, the sentencing analysis neither engaged with these observations, nor the recommendations of the sentencing circle in meaningful manner. The sentencing judge remarked that section 718.04 of the Criminal Code required that deterrence and denunciation be given primary consideration by the court in cases where, as emphasized by section 718.201, there is an increased vulnerability of Indigenous women in circumstances of intimate partner violence. A sentence of five years’ imprisonment was imposed for the aggravated assault, with a further eight months for the release order breaches.
The Court of Appeal for Nova Scotia, by majority, held that the sentencing judge erred in how the respondent’s mental health issues were considered in the sentencing analysis. The majority emphasized that the presence of mental illness, substance abuse, and other Gladue factors are relevant considerations in determining proportionate sentences. Even in cases of violence against Indigenous women, sections 718.04 and 718.201 do not negate or dilute the application of section 718.2(e) – the task of the sentencing judge is to balance the imperatives to be addressed by each provision. The Court of Appeal reduced the sentence to three years’ imprisonment, less remand credit of 18 months.
Majority judgment – O’Bonsawin J (Karakatsanis, Martin, Kasirer and Moreau JJ concurring)
The majority found that the Court of Appeal had correctly intervened to vary the sentence imposed, by re-weighing the various factors required by sections 718.2(e), 718.04, and 718.201 of the Criminal Code. While the majority considered that a reduction in the prison sentence was appropriate, they nevertheless stated that a sentence of imprisonment was required, in light of the grave nature of the offence and the particular vulnerability of the victim.
The majority held that section 718.2(e) required sentencing judges to undertake a two-step analysis derived from Gladue: (1) to take into consideration the unique or systemic background factors relevant to the moral blameworthiness of an Indigenous offender; and (2) to consider the types of sentencing procedures and sanctions that may be appropriate for the offender because of their indigeneity. This approach presented an opportunity to braid Indigenous law and legal traditions alongside the conventional application of sentencing law and advance the reconciliatory purpose of section 718.2(e), and to achieve the primary considerations of denunciation and deterrence through engagement with other sentencing objectives. Accordingly, the majority considered that a failure to meaningfully engage with a sentencing circle’s recommendations, while not a freestanding error in principle, may amount to a failure to properly conduct the second limb of the section 718.2(e) analysis.
Specific attention was drawn to the intention of Parliament in introducing each of the provisions to address pervasive harms to Indigenous offenders through overrepresentation in the criminal justice system, and to systemic violence of Indigenous women and girls. The majority quoted Senator Murray Sinclair who emphasized that these aims could be appropriately balanced and reconciled in the balancing analysis that the judiciary undertake in sentencing.
Importantly, the majority determined that the particular balance struck would be case-specific, but the analysis must be appropriately expressed in the courts’ reasons.
Minority judgment – Rowe and Jamal JJ (Wagner CJ and Côté J concurring)
The minority considered that the sentencing judge properly weighed all the relevant factors under sections 718.2(e), 718.04, and 718.201 of the Criminal Code.
The minority considered that where each of the provisions applied, a three‑step analysis should be utilized. In that analysis, the first step is consideration of the offence and victim, with attention giving to the purposes of sections 718.04 and 718.201. The second step is to consider the personal circumstances of the offender, whereby mitigating factors must be established on the balance of probabilities. The final step is to determine a proportionate sentence, which requires a application of the second-stage of the Gladue framework to consider alternatives to incarceration, but ultimately must reflect Parliament’s directive to prioritize denunciation and deterrence through section 718.04.
In the minority’s view, failure to engage with sentencing circle reports and recommendations can only amount to an error under section 718.2(e) if they impact the required Gladue analysis. Determining whether a sentencing circle has been adequately considered will be dependent upon the adequacy of a sentencing judge’s reasons demonstrating that the decision of the sentencing judge is discernible in light of the sentencing circle’s report or recommendations.
Further, the minority considered that the Court of Appeal ignored the direction that sentencing decisions attract significant deference and in reweighing the relevant considerations imposed a more lenient sentence that did not reflect the purposes of denunciation and deterrence, nor the victim’s vulnerability and the sentencing judge’s conclusion that the offender posed a continuing threat to society.
Asper Centre’s intervention
The Asper Centre intervened on the question of how courts should approach sentencing when sections 718.2(e), 718.04, and 718.201 of the Criminal Code are all engaged. The Asper Centre argued that in interpreting and applying these provisions, courts must have regard to the constitutional values and imperatives that they speak to. You can read the Asper Centre’s factum here.
Principally, the Asper Centre argued that section 718.2(e) of the Criminal Code is aimed at promoting substantive equality, as both a section 15Charter right and as a foundational principle of the criminal justice system, and at advancing reconciliation. Further, each of the provisions are aimed at the redress of systemic racism experienced by Indigenous people in the criminal legal system as perpetrators and victims of crime, and are not necessarily or inherently in conflict with each other. Rather they require that courts take into account the unique systemic or background factors effecting both perpetrators and victims, and to give real consideration to the types of sentencing procedures and sanctions which may be appropriate due to an offender’s Indigenous heritage or connection.
The Asper Centre submitted that the weighing of these factors is not a mechanical exercise in which a particular perspective on denunciation and deterrence prioritizing carceral sentencing options automatically prevails, but is instead focused on individualized, case-by-case sentencing. In doing so, it is of general importance that adequate reasons are provided, especially when engaging with sentencing circle recommendations, to thoughtfully and explicitly address those recommendations and further the reconciliatory purpose of section 718.2(e).
Although the Court did not explicitly engage with the Charter, the majority’s judgment embodies the spirit of those values and imperatives, by focusing attention on the purpose of the provisions.
Stephanie McCann-Hoey is a Research and Communications Assistant with the Asper Centre. She is an Australian lawyer attending the Master of Laws program at Jackman Law.


