2025 Cross-Canada Appellate Cases

Aracil-Morin v. Enoch Cree Nation, 2025 FCA 21:This appeal concerns the Enoch Cree Nation’s (ECN) denial of Band membership to the children of the appellant, Ethel Aracil-Morin. Aracil-Morin suffered under discriminatory Indian Act provisions that disenfranchised women upon marriage. Following Parliament’s 1985 amendments to the Indian Act that attempted to remedy this, Aracil-Morin sought and regained status with the ECN, her original band prior to marriage. Subsequently, the ECN adopted the 2004 Code, with a provision providing that “A Person who is, or has been, a member or an Indian of another Band is not entitled to membership”. This provision captured Aracil-Morin’s children, born in 1973 and 1983, who were members of the Kehewin Cree Nation, the appellant’s first husband. Before the Federal Court, the appellants argued that the impugned provisions of the ECN’s 2004 Code breached s. 15(1) of the Charter on the basis of gender. While finding that the first prong of Sharma was met by perpetuating the historical discrimination Aracil-Morin faced, the Court concluded that the appellants provided no evidence establishing that the impugned provisions impose a burden on or deny a benefit to Aracil-Morin’s children sufficient to meet the second half of the s. 15(1) framework.

The Court agreed that there was no evidence of adverse impact or effect sufficient to indicate a s. 15 breach. The second step of the Sharma framework required the appellants to show evidence illustrating the adverse impacts or effects they faced based on their exclusion from ECN membership, for instance, economic exclusion or disadvantage, social or political exclusion, and psychological or physical harms. While the appellants’ affidavits showcased their clear desire to join the ECN, they failed to demonstrate any adverse impact or effect under the Shamra framework. The Court of Appeal also denied the appellant’s request that they adopt the doctrine of judicial notice, given the high threshold for taking judicial notice, the fact that judicial notice wasn’t requested at trial, and that the appellants effectively sought to fulfill the second step of Sharma through judicial notice. Although the appeal was dismissed, the ECN is presently undertaking a consultation process to consider amendments to the 2004 Code, which could potentially allow Aracil-Morin’s children to become members if the impugned provisions are altered.

Canada (Attorney General) v. Dominique, 2025 FCA 24:This appeal concerns the Canadian Human Rights Tribunal’s allowance of a discrimination complaint filed by Gilbert Dominique, on behalf of members of the Pekuakamiulnuatsh First Nation and the Canadian Human Rights Commission. Dominique complained that the funding provided to him for the Pakuakamiulnuatsh First Nation’s policing service was insufficient and dependent on short-term agreements resulting in subpar service to the community, the consequences of which were related to their race and national or ethnic origin, in breach of the Canadian Human Rights Act.

The Attorney General of Canada advanced three arguments against the Tribunal’s decision: (1) that the analytical framework applied to the allegation of prima facie discrimination, including the Moore framework, was flawed, imposing a positive obligation on the federal government to address social inequalities; (2) that the Tribunal failed to consider contextual factors in their analysis, especially the ameliorative effect of the First Nations Policing Policy (“Policy”) and the First Nations Policing Program; and, (3) that the Province’s role in developing policing services for Indigenous communities was downplayed. The Federal Court of Appeal dismissed these three arguments. On the first argument, the Court noted that the Tribunal’s decisions, considered in light of the standard of reasonableness, were not flawed but rather consistent with the purposes of human rights legislation. On the second argument, the Court found no fundamental flaws in the Tribunal’s assessment of comparative evidence, which illustrated how the First Nation could not provide the same level of police service to its residents due to structural underfunding associated with shortcomings in the Policy. Finally, the Court found that although the provision of policing services is constitutionally allocated to the Provinces, they disagreed with the appellant that an assessment of the discriminatory nature of federal action would be at all dependent on the provincial legislature “choosing to place a given service at a given service level.”

Michel v. Canada (Attorney General), 2025 FCA 28: This case concerns an appeal from a dismissal of the plaintiffs’ motion to certify a proposed action against the respondent, on behalf of four subclasses of inmates affected by the Custody Rating Scale (CRS) employed by Correctional Services Canada (CSC). The plaintiff alleged that the CRS and other tools used by the CSC were biased against Indigenous female offenders, breaching s. 15 of the Charter. Due to a lack of material facts and an inadequately defined class, the Federal Court did not find a reasonable cause of action under s. 15. The Federal Court did not allow the plaintiffs to amend their Statement of Claim to address deficiencies, leading to this appeal.

The appeal was allowed in part, granting the appellants leave to amend their Statement of Claim and reapply for certification. The Federal Court did not err in striking the Statement of Claim, as the plaintiffs failed to set out the material facts necessary to establish a breach of s. 15. The Federal Court did, however, err by failing to provide leave to advance their claim. In considering s. 15 jurisprudence, the Court of Appeal found that it was not plain and obvious that there was no cause of action under s. 15.

Canadian Coalition for Firearm Rights v. Canada (Attorney General), 2025 FCA 82: This appeal concerns the Federal Court’s dismissal of six applications challenging Regulations SOR/2020-96 (“Regulations”), which effectively prohibited over 1500 previously legal firearms for licensed ownership and use. At trial, the appellants’ primarily argued that the Regulations were ultra vires s. 117.15(2) of the Criminal Code, also advancing a s. 7 Charter claim based on vagueness, overbreadth and arbitrariness, as well as ss. 8, 11, 15 and 26 Charter claims alongside the due process clause of s. 1(a) of the Canadian Bill of Rights.

The Federal Court of Appeal (“Court”) affirmed the Federal Court’s decision. In rejecting the appellants’ federalism arguments, the Court found that the Governor in Council reasonably considered public safety in assessing the prohibited firearms, especially given the broad and subjective wording of s. 117.15(2). The Court further found that the Charter arguments were appropriately dismissed at trial. The appellants’ s. 7 argument centred around unnamed variants captured by the Regulations, however, the Court did not find this aspect of the Regulations unacceptably vague so as to contravene s. 7. The appellants argued that the Regulations were arbitrary, citing an Amnesty Order allowing for the continued use of prohibited firearms for sustenance hunting and to exercise s. 35 Aboriginal and treaty rights. This argument was rejected, as the Amnesty Order was transitional in nature and, more critically, the previous uses for the now prohibited firearms was irrelevant to the arbitrariness and overbreadth analysis, as the State is allowed to react to changing circumstances (in this case growing public safety concerns). The Court also affirmed the Federal Court’s dismissal of the other Charter arguments and the Canadian Bill of Rights claim.

R v Korduner, 2025 ABCA 30: This appeal follows a summary conviction appeal judge’s finding that s. 320.31(9) of the Criminal Code unjustifiably violated the principle against self-incrimination protected by s. 7 of the Charter. Section 320.31(9) clarifies that, when peace officers demand breath samples from a person, “a statement made by [that] person to a peace officer, including a statement compelled under a provincial Act, is admissible in evidence”. The statement at issue in this case was compelled under s. 69 of Alberta’s Traffic Safety Act.

The majority of the Alberta Court of Appeal (“Court”) found that the trial judge and summary conviction appeal judge both erred in law by failing to conduct a contextual analysis to determine whether admitting the respondent’s statement would violate s. 7. Fagnan J.A. dissented, emphasizing parallels between the case at hand and that of R v White, [1999] 2 SCR 417, where the Supreme Court identified the right against self-incrimination as being contained in and protected by s. 7 of the Charter.

Rusinko v Alberta (Director of SafeRoads), 2025 ABCA 121: This case concerns a s. 7 claim against Alberta’s SafeRoads regime. The SafeRoads regime encompasses Alberta’s response to impaired driving and is implemented through four statutes: the Traffic Safety Act, the SafeRoads Alberta Regulation, the Provincial Administrative Penalties Act, and the Provincial Administrative Penalties Regulation. The respondents were issued Notices of Administrative Penalty under this regime, which they challenged as depriving them of their liberty to drive, and consequently engaging their s. 7 liberty rights. The Chambers Judge dismissed the Director of Saferoads’ application to strike the claim, on the basis that it was not “plain and obvious” that there was no Charter claim available. The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, clarifying that driving is a regulated activity rather than a “liberty” captured by s. 7 of the Charter.

JL Energy Transportation Inc v Alliance Pipeline Limited Partnership, 2025 ABCA 26: This is a federalism case concerning whether an intellectual property claim is subject to the two year limitation period enshrined in Alberta’s Limitations Act, or the 6 years set out in the federal Patent Act. The key constitutional issue the Alberta Court of Appeal (“Court”) considered was, if the two statutes were to conflict, which of the two would prevail. On this issue, they began by considering s. 91(22) of the Constitution Act, 1867, which allocates jurisdiction over Patents of Invention and Discovery to the federal government. Notwithstanding this fact, the Court noted that general limitation periods are also within provincial jurisdiction as matters of property and civil rights under s. 92(13) of the Constitution Act, 1867. Ultimately, the Court held that the Alberta Limitations Act was never intended to apply to patent infringement claims like the one at issue here, as the Act was never meant to apply to rights created under federal legislation subject to federal limitation periods. There was no need to resort to the doctrine of federal paramountcy. Rather, the Court’s interpretation of the Limitations Act was kept consistent with the principle of interpreting legislation within constitutional boundaries.

R. v. Pietz, 2025 MBCA 5: This case concerns the constitutionality of police investigations prior to the appellant’s conviction for manslaughter. The appellant sought a stay of proceedings under s. 24(1) of the Charter for alleged violations of his ss. 9 and 10(b) rights. Leading up to conviction, the appellant was taken on a “drive interview” in which he was questioned, berated, and left vulnerably cold during a walkaround of the suspected crime scene. The appellant was not permitted to have a second consultation with counsel before the drive interview. The trial judge rejected the appellant’s submissions that his Charter rights were violated. She also concluded that, even if his Charter rights were violated, a stay of proceedings pursuant to s. 24(1) would not have been appropriate. The Manitoba Court of Appeal agreed with the trial judge that the appellant’s ss. 9 and 10(b) rights were not violated. Given that the drive was a part of the ongoing investigation to attempt to have the accused confess to the crime, it was not unreasonable for the police officers to drive to the location. The detention conditions were therefore related to its lawful purpose, and not arbitrary under s. 9. Further, the Court did not find a violation of s. 10(b). The constitutional right to a second consultation with counsel did not arise in this case, since there was no change in jeopardy to the appellant following his arrest, and there were no changed circumstances that would render the initial advice insufficient or incorrect.

R v Desilva, 2025 MBCA 30: This case concerns the constitutional validity of a search warrant founded on an anonymous tip. The Crown (the appellants) argued that the trial judge erred in concluding that the respondent’s s. 8 rights were violated, and in granting a remedy under s. 24(2) to exclude the evidence obtained on the execution of the search warrant. The Manitoba Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that there was no breach of the accused’s s. 8 rights. The Court found that the trial judge failed to apply the correct test to review the sufficiency of the search warrant, giving undue weight to the fact that not every aspect of the information from the tip was corroborated. Applying the correct test to assess search warrants, the Court found that the authorizing justice could have issued the search warrant in the circumstances, given the reliability of the informant and the fact that police independently confirmed much of the information from the tip through further investigation.

Ontario Place Protectors v. Ontario, 2025 ONCA 183: This case concerned legislation passed in relation to rebuilding Ontario Place. The Rebuilding Ontario Place Act (ROPA) exempted Ontario Place from statutory requirements from existing legislation, extinguished causes of action relating to Ontario Place against the Crown and its agents, and precluded the awards of costs and other remedies. The appellant argued that ROPA violated s. 96 of the Constitution Act, 1867, which protects the core jurisdiction of courts from Parliament or a provincial legislature. The Ontario Court of Appeal concluded that the appellant should be granted public interest standing, given they are deeply concerned with issues surrounding Ontario Place’s development and accordingly have a genuine interest in challenging the constitutionality of ROPA. Additionally, the application represented a “reasonable and effective means of bringing the challenge to court”.

However, the Ontario Court of Appeal held that ROPA did not violate s. 96. The Act did not remove judicial review remedies, owing to a provision which carved out a judicial review mechanism despite precluding other remedies. Further, the Act does not prevent the superior courts from acting as courts in the requisite sense, since it merely immunizes the Crown of liability in respect of Ontario Place redevelopment. This is not constitutionally objectionable: comprehensive Crown immunity in respect of other statutes does not inhibit the essential functions or decision-making abilities of the courts, and therefore does not violate s. 96.

R. v. McGowan-Morris, 2025 ONCA 349: This case concerns the constitutionality of warrantless vehicle and personal searches conducted by police under the Cannabis Control Act. The Act permits police to search a vehicle and any occupants without a warrant if they have reasonable grounds to believe the Act is being contravened. In this case, police stopped and searched two individuals and their vehicle pursuant to the Act. The individuals were subsequently charged with various firearms offenses and challenged the search, alleging violations of their rights under sections 8, 9, 10(a), and 10(b) of the Charter.

The Ontario Court of Appeal found no breach of sections 9 or 10(a). Under section 10(a), the Court held that officers are not required to cite the specific statute authorizing the search. It was sufficient that the officers informed the individuals they were stopped because of suspected cannabis possession in the vehicle. Section 10(a) only requires that detainees be informed of the reasons for their detention, not the methods by which the investigation will proceed. Regarding section 9, the Court found that the use of force was not excessive given the dangerous circumstances confronting the officers, and thus did not amount to arbitrary detention. However, the Court held that section 10(b) of the Charter—the right to counsel—was infringed. It rejected the Crown’s argument that the reasoning from Orbanski (which allows brief suspension of section 10(b) rights during roadside sobriety stops) applied here. Unlike sobriety stops, searches under the Cannabis Control Act can be extensive and intrusive. The Court ruled that the statute does not implicitly justify a limitation on section 10(b), and that practical difficulties or inconvenience alone cannot justify infringing Charter rights. Despite finding a section 10(b) breach, the Court declined to exclude the evidence under section 24(2) of the Charter. The breach was deemed not serious due to its very brief duration. Furthermore, the breach had minimal impact, as it did not causally contribute to the discovery of the evidence. Admitting the evidence would therefore not bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

R. v. Vrbanic, 2025 ONCA 151: This case addresses whether delays in bringing a group of individuals charged with drug trafficking to trial could be justified by the complexity of the proceedings, and thereby exempted from the presumptive time limit established in R v Jordan. The central issue was whether the case’s complexity constituted an “exceptional circumstance” under Jordan, sufficient to justify a delay that exceeded the prescribed time ceiling. The Ontario Court of Appeal upheld the application judge’s conclusion that it did not. In assessing complexity, the application judge correctly considered several relevant factors, including the length and nature of a Garofoli application (challenging the validity of wiretap authorizations), the scope and duration of the police investigation, and the breadth of the resulting charges. However, the application judge ultimately found that these factors did not render the case exceptionally complex under the Jordan framework. There were no errors in this reasoning. While the trial judge initially miscalculated the total delay, the Ontario Court of Appeal found that this error had no bearing on the broader assessment of whether the delay was justified. Even when corrected, the delay slightly exceeded the Jordan ceiling. The Court also rejected the notion that a delay marginally over the ceiling could be excused on a “close enough” basis. It emphasized that allowing such an exception would undermine the certainty and cultural shift demanded by Jordan, which was intended to combat systemic delay and complacency in the criminal justice system.

Hillier v. Ontario, 2025 ONCA 259: This case examines the constitutionality of provincial COVID-19 regulations that prohibited gatherings without exception, including for the purpose of peaceful protest. The applicant, Mr. Hillier, was charged under provincial legislation for organizing or hosting events that violated pandemic gathering limits. He challenged the regulations on the basis that they infringed his right to peaceful assembly under section 2(c) of the Charter. The Court began by affirming the scope of section 2(c), which protects the collective pursuit of common goals through public assembly. Peaceful assembly is a key expression of participatory democracy and political engagement. The Court found that the regulations clearly restricted this freedom by imposing an absolute ban on all gatherings, including those for protest or religious purposes. The availability of online alternatives was not sufficient to preserve the core of the freedom, and thus the regulations were found to infringe section 2(c). Turning to the section 1 analysis, the Court held that the restrictions were aimed at a pressing and substantial objective of ensuring public health and that the measures were rationally connected to that goal. However, the regulations failed the minimal impairment test. By enacting an outright ban with no room for limited outdoor protests, the legislation was not narrowly tailored. Moreover, at the balancing stage, the Court concluded that the severe impacts on peaceful assembly outweighed the uncertain public health benefits of a total prohibition on peaceful outdoor gatherings. As a result, the Court held that the infringement of section 2(c) could not be justified under section 1. In a subsequent related case, the Court issued a remedy of reading down the regulation to render it constitutionally compliant. It interpreted the law to permit gatherings for the purpose of peaceful assembly and protest involving up to 10 individuals.

Sutherland Estate v. Murphy, 2025 ONCA 227: This case concerns the application of s. 11(c) of the Charter, which protects one from being compelled to testify against themselves, in the context of civil contempt. During an investigation of an allegedly fraudulent cryptocurrency scheme, an appellant was found to be in contempt of an Anton Piller order, which authorized the seizure of the appellant’s cell phones and other data. The motion judge ordered the appellant to attend examinations for discovery where he would be asked about the location of assets and data. The appellant argued that these mandatory examinations violated s. 11(c).

The Ontario Court of Appeal held that s. 11(c) applies in the context of civil contempt. A person facing a contempt allegation is ‘charged with an offense’ within the meaning of s. 11 because the penal consequences associated with civil contempt declarations attract constitutional scrutiny. Further, civil contempt goes “beyond the vindication of purely private interests” because it is linked to the rule of law and the preservation of social order. Though it may be important to distinguish between the punitive (criminal) and coercive (civil) purposes of compelled testimony, the jurisprudence demonstrates that s. 11(c) applies to both purposes, provided that the contempt proceedings carry the threat of imprisonment. The distinction between the twin objectives of coercion and punishment is tenuous. The Court also held that s. 11(c) applies to sentencing proceedings given recent jurisprudential developments that chart a more generous, flexible, and purposive approach to applying s. 11 in the context of sentencing. In this case, the appellant was compelled to attend five examinations, and his rights under s. 11(c) were breached each time. In turn, the motion judge erred in relying on compelled testimony to find the appellant in contempt of court. The Court remitted the matter back to the Superior Court to determine the penalty for other acts of contempt not at issue in this case.

R. v. Murray, 2025 ONCA 222: This case deals with the conviction and sentencing of two brothers, Curtis and Corey Murray, for second-degree murder. The appeal concerns the police’s failure to preserve some video evidence, and the Crown’s late disclosure of this fact to the defence. The Ontario Court of Appeal rejected each of the appellants’ submissions that the loss of this evidence constitutes a violation of their s. 7 rights. First, the appellants argued that the late disclosure caused them irremediable prejudice, since the delay prevented them from pursuing defence arguments and assembling useful footage from what remained of the video evidence. Accordingly, they argue that the Crown’s negligent loss of data can breach the right to disclosure articulated in Stinchcombe. However, the Ontario Court of Appeal held that Stinchcombe does not confer a right to be told in advance by the Crown what investigators intend to do with evidence, or to direct the police investigation. Further, the delay still left the defence with a reasonable time to examine the available evidence. Second, the appellants argued that the failure to produce evidence constituted an abuse of process. The Court rejected this argument, finding that there was a plausible explanation for the mishap given the Crown had substituted counsel during the proceedings. The Court found that the trial judge’s conclusions were well-founded and entitled to significant deference. Third, the Court found that the trial judge’s instructions clearly conveyed to the jury how to consider the missing evidence.

R. v. Ordonio, 2025 ONCA 135: This case concerns the constitutionality of a statement provided by the accused which was subsequently used as evidence in their conviction for first-degree murder. The Ontario Court of Appeal rejected the appellant’s argument that statements made using the Reid Technique are presumptively involuntary. The existing common law confessions rule already provides that statements made to authorities are admissible only if the Crown can prove they were elicited voluntarily. This is determined on a contextual basis having regard to the categories of inducements, oppression, operating mind, and police trickery. The Reid Technique is not inherently oppressive or coercive, and its use should be subject to scrutiny on a case-by-case basis. The current confessions rule suffices to prevent problems arising from coercive investigations. Further, the difficulty of ascertaining what exactly constitutes the “Reid Technique” and when it has been deployed “would create an issue that would consume more judicial resources without any apparent forensic benefit as compared to the application of the existing confessions rule.”

However, the Court accepted the appellant’s argument that the trial judge erred by failing to assess the effects of the interrogation on the appellant, which led to the admission. The judge took a “piecemeal” approach by limiting her assessment of the impact on the accused to specific points of time, rather than considering the amalgamation of oppressive conditions as having a cumulative effect. The Court ordered a new trial and remitted the issue of the statement’s admissibility to the new trial judge.

R. v. Chen, 2025 ONCA 168: This case concerns the constitutionality of the appellant’s interpretation accommodations at their trial. The appellant, a Taishanese speaker, received interpretation in Cantonese and thus did not fully understand the language of the trial. The appellant argued that this faulty interpretation violated his s. 14 Charter rights to language assistance. The Ontario Court of Appeal found that the interpretation provided at trial fell short of the standard required by the Charter. Expert testimony revealed that the interpreter used language that the appellant could not have reasonably understood, and that the interpreter made errors in interpreting the appellant’s speech to the court. Though the appellant conceded that they could understand some Cantonese, the Court was satisfied that there was a real possibility that the accused may not have understood a part of the proceedings by virtue of their difficulty with the language being used in court. Even though the accused did not themselves raise an issue regarding the interpreter’s confidence during the trial, courts have an independent responsibility to ensure that their proceedings are fair, and this includes an obligation to protect an accused’s right to interpreter assistance, irrespective of whether the right has been formally asserted. The Court ordered a new trial.

A.A.L. v. R., 2025 NBCA 55: This case concerns the appellant’s conviction of three counts of sexual assault. The appellant asserts that his ability to make full answer and defence was interfered with, that the police investigation was incomplete and biased, that the jury instructions were faulty, and that the trial judge failed to consider an alternative hypothesis. All of these, the appellant argues, violated his Charter rights to a fair trial. The New Brunswick Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal against conviction. The Court found that failure to disclose psychological records were explained adequately by procedural moves by the defence, and therefore did not obstruct the appellant’s ability to make full answer and defence. The Court found that nothing about the police investigation rose to the level of prejudice, and followed the reasoning in R v Darwish that “inadequacies in an investigation…do not…themselves constitute a denial of the right to make full answer and defence.” The Court also found that the judge fulfilled the obligations of instructing the jury, given that the instructions clearly outlined the charges and other procedural instructions, and thus the jury was fully equipped to conduct meaningful deliberations about the charge. Given the factual matrix, the Court decided that nothing would have permitted the judge to charge the jury on an “alternative hypothesis” of parental alienation, which was not grounded in the evidence nor argued at trial. In sum, each of the appellant’s claims were dismissed on appeal.

R.S. v. R., 2025 NBCA 53: This case concerns the appellant’s conviction of sexual assault. The appellant appeals their conviction on the basis that, among other things, the judge undermined their credibility by claiming they “tailored” their evidence to the disclosure or courtroom testimony. Following the principles set out in R v G.V., this undermines the accused’s right to be present at trial and their Charter rights under s. 7 and 11(d) to make a full answer and defence. The New Brunswick Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal. The Court found that, while the judge could have been more precise in their wording when stating that the appellant’s evidence appeared “tailored”, the judge’s words were tantamount to a finding that the appellant and their spouse had coordinated their accounts to refute the charge. Moreover, the judge clarified that while this observation would factor into his overall analysis of the evidence, it would not be a dominant or decisive element in his final determination. Given that reasons for judgment must be read contextually as a whole, and are not intended to be a verbalization of the entire process engaged in by the trial judge in reaching a verdict, the Court found that the judge’s use of the word “tailored” is not tantamount to a violation of the appellant’s Charter rights.

J.R. v. Nunavut (Family Services), 2025 NLCA 11: This case concerns a decision made by Nunavut Family Services (and upheld by a trial judge) to remove an Indigenous child from their foster mother’s custody. The decision was made such that the child could meet and live with their sibling in Ottawa. The foster mother argued that the child will suffer harm from being removed, abruptly and permanently, from her care. Further, his best interests are protected by maintaining the status quo or altering the status quo by her becoming the child’s guardian or custodian. The Newfoundland and Labrador Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred in their application of the test for injunctions established by RJR-MacDonald. Further, the trial judge’s application of the Act respecting First Nations, Inuit and Métis children, youth and families suffered from procedural error since it was applied in the absence of notice to the applicant. The trial judge also erred in their application of the Act by elevating the possibility of placing a child with siblings to be a priority consideration when placing the child, rather than a factor which should be considered in determining the overall best interests of the child. The stability or permanency of the proposed new placement, in comparison to the status quo, and many other factors, must also be considered in determining the best interests of this child. On the facts, the child’s removal from the foster mother would have led to uncertain placement conditions. The Court of Appeal remitted the matter to a trial court for proper adjudication.

R. v. Lawlor, 2025 NLCA 2: This case concerns the appellant’s conviction of sexual assault. The appellant argues that they received ineffective assistance of counsel, constituting a violation of their Charter rights. The appellant claims that his former counsel failed to explain to him that he could elect a trial by judge and jury, and, instead, elected the mode of trial without instruction. The appellant argued that this denied him the right to control his own defence and his conviction was therefore based on a miscarriage of justice. The Newfoundland and Labrador Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal. Following R v White, the Court reasoned that ineffective counsel is established by (1) counsel’s acts or omissions which constitute incompetence; and (2) a resulting miscarriage of justice. However, the Court found that the appellant had control in electing to proceed with a judge-alone trial since he wanted to “avoid publicity”. The appellant’s former counsel competently guided the appellant through the modes of trial available. Further, the Court dismissed the appellant’s procedural arguments that the trial was conducted unfairly.

R. v. Cromwell, 2025 NSCA 37: This case concerns the constitutionality of a search undertaken upon the respondent. Following a 9-1-1 call alleging that the respondent brandished a gun during a road rage incident, the respondent was arrested and searched for weapons. Later, the respondent was strip-searched and police discovered cocaine. The respondent was charged with drug trafficking and firearms offenses. At trial, the judge found that the strip-search violated the respondent’s s. 8 Charter rights against unreasonable search and seizure. In response, the judge issued a global stay of charges. The Crown appealed, arguing that the judge erred in not limiting the stay to the drug charge alone, so the weapons and violence-related charges could proceed to trial on the merits.

The Nova Scotia Court of Appeal held that the remedy issued by the trial judge exceeded that which was necessary in the circumstances. The imposition of a stay is reserved for cases where “the affront to fair play and decency is disproportionate to the societal interest in the effective prosecution of criminal cases”: R. v. Babos, 2014 SCC 16 at para. 44. The Court found that the searches for firearms and drugs were two discrete events, and the firearms search occurred prior to and regardless of the Charter-breaching conduct. In precluding the possibility of distinguishing these events for the purposes of preserving some evidence with a remedy under s. 24(2), the trial judge erred by not properly weighing the societal factors, nor meaningfully considering society’s interest in the prosecution of firearms offences. The judge also failed to properly consider the victim’s interests in prosecuting the firearms offence. A temporal and contextual distinction must be drawn between the two discrete charges in this case when assessing the appropriate remedy for the s. 8 breach. The Court allowed the appeal, vacating the stay of charges for the firearms offence and remitting the matter to the divisional court.

Mercer v. Yukon (Government of), 2025 YKCA 5: This case concerns Yukon’s declaration of emergency under s. 6(1) of the Civil Emergency Measures Act (CEMA) in response to the COVID-19 pandemic. During the emergency order, the Minister of Community Services enacted orders relating to border closures, quarantines, government contracts and leases, limitation periods, licensing, and social assistance. The appellant argued that the powers created by CEMA violates the constitutional structure of the Yukon Act by shifting legislative power to the executive branch and precluding judicial review, ousting the core jurisdiction of the courts. The Yukon Act describes the powers of the legislature and it was not contested that “the constitutional challenge to CEMA can be made on the basis of the Yukon Act, the Constitution Act, 1867 and the jurisprudence related to the Constitution including unwritten constitutional principles”. The Yukon Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal. They agreed with the trial judge that unconstitutional written principles cannot be used to strike legislation in this case, following the City of Toronto SCC ruling that unconstitutional written principles may only be used to 1) aid in the interpretation of constitutional provisions; and 2) to assist in developing unstated structural doctrines that can fill gaps regarding questions on which the text of the Constitution is silent. Additionally, the Court considered the Act’s delegation of powers to the executive to be within its constitutional authority.

Procureur général du Québec c. Quebec English School Boards Association, 2025 QCCA 383: This case concerns amendments to the Education Act prescribed by Quebec’s Bill 40. A Superior Court decision declared certain provisions of Bill 40 and the resulting amendments in the Education Act unconstitutional as they unjustifiably infringed the rights of Quebec’s English-language minority under Section 23 of the Charter. The Superior Court found that these provisions undermined the exclusivity of management and control of English-language school boards by the English minority, because the provisions allowed individuals outside Quebec’s linguistic minority to vote in English-language school elections.

The Court of Appeal of Quebec (the “Court”) upheld most of the Superior Court’s decision. Because the impugned provisions confer exclusive management and control rights on representatives of the linguistic minority, those who are not part of the minority language community are unable to control and manage the educational facilities of that language community. Further, the impugned provisions unduly limit the number of potential candidates for the “parent representative” and “community representative” positions, increasing the difficulty of forming a proper board of directors. Finally, by imposing a mandatory percentage of non‑elected employees on the board of directors who might not belong to the relevant linguistic minority, Bill 40 directly infringes the “full rights of management and control” that representatives of the linguistic minority must enjoy under s. 23(3)(b) of the Charter. The Court found that no pressing and substantial objective pertained to Bill 40, and declared many of the provisions inoperative subject to an 18-month suspension of invalidity.

A. P. c. Procureur général du Québec, 2025 QCCA 24: This case concerns a provision of the Quebec Health Insurance Act which sets a cap on the reimbursement of medical services received outside Quebec. The appellant argues that the provision discriminates against Quebec women that require reproductive health care, thereby violating s. 15 of the Charter.

The Court of Appeal of Quebec dismissed the appeal. The Court found that the provisions did not have adverse and differential effects against women, since the Act does not distinguish between insured persons: men are not conferred an advantage that women, or certain women, are denied, excluded from or deprived of. Rather, the same disadvantage and the same risk of disadvantage are imposed on all insured persons. All insured persons under the Act receive both the same benefit and the same disadvantage: any person receiving insured medical services outside Quebec within the meaning of the Act is entitled to the reimbursement or the payment of the expenses they assumed, but up to the limit set by the impugned provision, a limit that applies in all cases, whether the service is specific to sex, gender or any other characteristic. Additionally, the Act does not discriminate in a similar way to the Eldridge case, in which apparently equal treatment can lead to discriminatory distinctions. The Court distinguished Eldridge, finding that the evidence does not show how the Act would have a more pronounced adverse impact on women, as compared to men or members of other groups based on a differential treatment in relation to the same benefit such as access to health care and services.